New Delhi, Sep 4 (IANS) The thaw in Indo-China relations is emerging as one of the most intriguing developments in Asian geopolitics. For nearly five years, ties between the two civilizational giants were defined largely by mistrust, recrimination, and a sharp decline in engagement.
The Galwan clash of 2020 was not only a military confrontation but a psychological rupture that shook the foundations of diplomatic trust painstakingly built since the early 1990s. It froze dialogue, disrupted trade pathways, and severed the soft tissue of people-to-people contact that sustains long-term ties.
Yet, as 2025 unfolds, both sides appear willing to experiment with a limited but visible thaw. The question is whether this tentative easing can lay the groundwork for a durable turnaround.
The most recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin provided a powerful backdrop for this re-engagement.
For the first time in seven years, an Indian Prime Minister set foot on Chinese soil, exchanging words with President Xi Jinping and holding substantive discussions with senior Chinese leaders.
This encounter was less about symbolism than about recalibrating strategies. Both leaders, while careful to avoid any premature display of warmth, used the occasion to test the waters for cooperation in areas that transcend their disputes.
Xi called for a multipolar order free of hegemonic dominance, while India used the opportunity to underscore the importance of connectivity, regional stability, and respect for sovereignty.
The very act of sitting across the table at a multilateral stage, after years of frost, signaled the possibility of dialogue without surrendering core interests.
Yet summits alone do not rebuild trust; the deeper signal of change lies in renewed emphasis on people-centric engagement.
One of the most notable steps in 2025 was the agreement in principle to resume direct flights between India and China.
These air links, suspended in the wake of the border crisis, had become a powerful metaphor for the freeze in ties.
Their restoration will not only halve the travel inconvenience for students, business leaders, and families but also re-energise the tourism and services sector.
Airlines from both countries stand ready to benefit, but more importantly, the people-to-people dividends of such connectivity could re-humanize a relationship reduced to strategic acrimony. India’s insistence on negotiating a fresh Air Services Agreement, rather than rushing into the resumption, reflects a desire to balance economic gain with national security concerns.
Even so, the very act of working on this agreement suggests a willingness to let engagement, rather than estrangement, drive policy.
Cultural diplomacy has also found renewed expression. The Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra, suspended since the late 2010s, has been restored for the summer of 2025.
For thousands of Indian pilgrims, this sacred journey holds immense emotional and spiritual value. By reopening this corridor, China is not merely allowing religious tourism but extending an olive branch that resonates deeply with Indian society.
Such cultural concessions have historically been used as tools of soft diplomacy, and their return indicates that Beijing recognises the importance of social optics in improving ties.
Likewise, the gradual easing of visa issuance for Chinese citizens in India and the reactivation of academic and media exchanges point to a deliberate strategy of rebuilding the connective tissue of society-to-society contact.
Still, optimism must be tempered with realism. The thaw in Indo-China ties is fragile and limited. Border patrols remain vigilant, military disengagement at certain friction points is incomplete, and the broader security architecture of Asia continues to be shaped by strategic competition.
India’s concerns over its trade deficit with China, its restrictions on Chinese investment in sensitive sectors, and its hesitancy over critical technologies remain firmly in place.
Similarly, China’s deepening strategic partnership with Pakistan and its assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific remain sources of anxiety in New Delhi.
The distrust is structural, not incidental, and therefore cannot be erased through a handful of symbolic gestures. Yet this is precisely why the present thaw deserves attention. Realists in international relations argue that rival powers, even in conflict, often pursue cooperation in areas of mutual gain.
For India and China, the costs of permanent estrangement are high. Both nations are engines of the global economy, with overlapping needs in energy security, climate cooperation, and regional connectivity.
Trade, despite all the restrictions and deficits, continues to grow, illustrating a paradox: economic pragmatism endures even when political trust is low. The decision to restore flights and ease movement of people is an extension of this pragmatism—acknowledging that complete decoupling is neither feasible nor desirable.
The SCO summit reinforced this point. India, while resisting any tilt towards China’s vision of a Sino-centric order, nevertheless participated actively in discussions on counterterrorism, infrastructure development, and financial cooperation.
Xi Jinping’s offers of yuan-denominated assistance and emphasis on South-South cooperation found resonance with many members, but India carved a careful path of engagement without alignment.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s sideline meetings, including one with Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi, were viewed by observers as more substantive than the brief handshake with Xi.
Such parallel channels of diplomacy highlight India’s strategy of testing incremental pathways without compromising its strategic autonomy.
The broader significance of people-to-people contact must not be underestimated. In the decades preceding Galwan, academic exchanges, tourism, cultural delegations, and business interactions created a cushion of familiarity that softened the hard edges of geopolitics.
The abrupt suspension of these links hardened public perceptions and contributed to the image of China as an adversary rather than a neighbor.
Re-establishing these links—through restored flights, pilgrimages, academic collaborations, and media visits—can play a role in slowly reshaping narratives. The political class may remain divided, but societal exposure has the potential to humanize the “other”, reducing space for zero-sum thinking.
There is also a regional logic for the thaw. South Asia remains one of the most fragile regions in terms of development and security. From climate vulnerability to fragile supply chains, the region cannot afford a prolonged India-China confrontation.
Even limited cooperation—sharing hydrological data on cross-border rivers, aligning on disaster relief, or coordinating on public health—can yield collective benefits. If Asia is to anchor a multipolar world order, its two largest states must at least be able to talk, if not yet embrace.
The thaw, then, is less about transforming adversaries into allies and more about recognizing the necessity of coexistence. What would a real turnaround require?
First, sustained commitment to step-by-step measures that expand societal and economic linkages while leaving complex disputes to structured negotiations.
Second, recognition that while strategic competition will endure, it can be managed without bleeding into every dimension of bilateral ties.
Third, the political will to resist domestic pressures that thrive on demonizing the other. Both leaderships will have to persuade their constituencies that engagement does not equal capitulation, and that pragmatism often serves national interest better than perpetual hostility.
The symbolism of Indian pilgrims trekking once again to Mansarovar, of Chinese students enrolling in Indian universities, or of flights ferrying entrepreneurs across borders may appear modest in comparison to the great strategic contestations of our time.
But these modest symbols are precisely what can lay the foundation for long-term stability. Grand strategies falter when public trust collapses; conversely, even fragile peace endures when societies invest in each other.
The thaw in Indo-China relations, then, is not a sudden reconciliation but a gradual re-humanization of a fractured relationship.
If nurtured carefully, it could mark the beginning of a pragmatic cohabitation between two giants who may never cease to compete, but who must learn to coexist. In the calculus of global politics, that alone would be a significant achievement.
–IANS
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