New Delhi, March 25 (IANS) Pakistan has been placed by the United State’s top Intelligence official, Tulsi Gabbard as a country whose advancing missile capabilities could eventually put the US within its reach. Director of National Intelligence, Gabbard, while presenting the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment before the Senate Intelligence Committee, also said that Pakistan was researching and developing novel, advanced or traditional missile delivery systems with nuclear and conventional payloads that put the US within range.
Pakistan has however rejected the assertion and said that its strategic capabilities are exclusively defensive in nature and is aimed at safeguarding national sovereignty and maintaining peace and stability in the region. While Islamabad lives in denial, the US clearly notes that Pakistan is continuing to increasingly develop sophisticated technology.
There is a clear gap between Pakistan’s claimed doctrine of ‘credible deterrence’ and the scale and global footprint of its actual activities. Pakistan has maintained that its nuclear and missile programmes are India-centric. However if one looks at the evolution of the Shaheen-III, which has a range of nearly 2,750 kilometres and the development of the Ababeel, capable of carrying out multiple independently targetable warheads, it becomes clear that Pakistan has gone beyond immediate regional requirements.
Disinfo Lab, a group of researchers who investigate Info-warfare and Psy-war, revealed in a series of posts on X that Pakistan has one of the most notorious proliferation records in developing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WBD). It says that one does not build Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) capability for a neighbour which is 2,750 kilometres away. The reference was being made to Shaheen-III, which is capable of reaching Iran. A missile of this class brings cities like Tehran within its range and this signals Pakistan’s technical ambitions which edge towards longer-range delivery systems.
Officials say that if the deterrence is limited only to India, then why is Pakistan pursuing capabilities that exceed that operational scope. Disinfo Lab also points towards the network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan, who is widely regarded as the architect of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. This network remains one of the most extensive proliferation operations in modern history. It is a well known fact that Khan’s network supplied sensitive nuclear technology and designs to Iran, North Korea and Libya. The network operated through a web of intermediaries across continents. They used shell companies, illicit financial channels and front-end procurement structures.
Pakistan says that it has distanced itself from Khan’s activities, but the legacy of the network continues to shape how global Intelligence agencies interpret Pakistan’s present-day actions. Washington has since 2023 sanctioned scores of entities that are linked to Pakistan’s missile and nuclear programmes, which include both domestic firms and foreign suppliers especially from China. At the centre of this ecosystem are state-linked entities such as the National Development Complex (NDC) and AERO, Pakistan’s military procurement arm for cruise missiles and strategic UAVs.
AERO, despite being blacklisted in 2014 has continued to acquire sensitive components through intermediary firms. Most of these entities have no public presence, no identifiable workforce and no transparent financials. A feature in the recent sanctions is the role that the Chinese firms have played. They have been accused of supplying critical components, which range from filament winding machines to advanced welding systems that are used in the production of missiles. These technologies fall under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which restricts proliferation of systems that are capable of delivering a payload of over 500 kilogrammes beyond 300 kilometres. Pakistan is not a signatory to the MTCR and limits its ability to procure such technologies through legitimate channels.
The US findings say that this has led to the expansion of covert procurement routes that involve intermediaries based in Karachi, front-end trading firms and dual-use equipment masking. The United States has between 2023 and 2025 carried out multiple rounds of sanctions which targetted entities linked to Pakistan’s missile programme. Such sanctions are backed by Intelligence assessments that have indicated active procurement attempts, ongoing programme expansion and risk of proliferation of diversion.
Officials say that the big concern is that Pakistan’s weapons programme is not just static, not strictly regional. Instead, the programme is advancing technologically, expanding procurement networks and operating through increasingly opaque channels. Pakistan however continues to project its nuclear arsenal as a defensive shield, which is limited and region-specific. Despite these claims, the writing is on the wall and Pakistan has been illegally expanding its missile and nuclear capabilities. Pakistan watchers say that the concern is no longer about deterrence in South Asia, but about a programme which raises serious and dangerous questions. Experts say that with so much material out in the open about Pakistan’s real intentions, the narrative of minimum deterrence has turned out to be a bluff.
–IANS
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